

[Work in progress]

Conceptualising State Border as Institutionalized Arrangement – A Tentative Outline

26/11/2017

Norbert Cyrus

Viadrina Center B/ORDERS IN MOTION

Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder)

0. Summary

The study of borders is a highly fragmented and disparate area of research. For the purpose of this paper, the examination will focus exclusively on *state border* as reference subject and explore its status as institution assigned with functions with the conceptual lens of *the institutional facts theory* (Searle) in combination with a *functional analysis approach* (Merton). In a second step, the concept of *arrangement* (Schatzki) is introduced in order to consider its sensitizing potential for the factors influencing the particular shape, functional composition and performance of state border functions.

1. Border as stimulating and confusing metaphor

Without doubt, the label Border Studies point to an impressive array of research and publication activities, organized in two international networks, communicating through topical journals and presenting research state-of-the-art in reputable handbooks (Wilson, Donnan 2012; Wastl-Walter 2011). The beginning of this focussed and academic occupation with border related issues can be traced back to the late 1980s when the collapse of the socialist state system had triggered the imagination of a ‘borderless world’. However, empirical observations disapproved this imagination. State borders did not only persist but multiplied and many borders became more tightly controlled (Brown 2010).

Border Studies were initiated by researchers affiliated with Political Geography who noticed that the relevance of state borders decreased in some regions and increased in some others. State of the art reports indicate that Border Studies abandoned the view of borders as mere lines and the notion of their location as solely at the ‘edges’ of spaces but

‘advanced spatial imaginations which suggest that the key issues are not the ‘lines’ or ‘edges’ themselves, or not even the events and processes occurring in these contexts, but nonmobile and mobile social practices and discourses where borders - as processes, sets of sociocultural practices, symbols, institutions, and networks - are produced, reproduced, and transcended’ (Paasi 2012: 2304).

The indicated conceptual frames - to the best of my knowledge - are neither applied in a consistent and thorough way (e.g. they are metaphorically applied) nor is the relationship

between these angles clarified. Consequently, Border Studies developed to a diversified and highly fragmented and disparate research area with an ‘overextended’ metaphorical terminology: ‘The term border has attracted an impressive barrage of metaphors’ (O’Dowd 2010, p. 1038) and is applied to denote a vast array of distinct issues or subjects.

Border studies subsume the investigation of borders and of boundaries without having achieved a broader consensus about conceptual clarifications what distinguishes borders from boundaries.

- One understanding bases on the distinction of degree of formality of organization. In this view, boundaries are less and borders are more formally organized (Parker, Adler-Nissen 2012).
- Another proposal conceives ‘borders as external territorial frontiers and boundaries as internal social categorizations’ (Fassin 2011: 214).
- Still another social sciences approach defines borders as ‘the site where citizenship is strongly enforced (through passport checks, for instance) and thus provide most individuals with a concrete, local and powerful experience of the state’, while social boundaries ‘are objectified forms of social differences manifested in unequal access to unequal distribution of resources (material and nonmaterial) and social opportunities’ (Lamont, Molnár 2002: 183 & 168).

The conceptual relation between boundary and border is still dubious and the terms often conflated. In addition, the terminology is inconsistently applied. For example, the term ‘bordering’ recently introduced in Border Studies is used with different semantic connotations.

- In one understanding, bordering refers to processes of demarcation through which borders are constructed and the categories of difference or separation are created (Newman 2006: 148).
- Another understanding conceives bordering as a process sorting people and things, which alters the perception of that thing by setting it within a web of normative claims, teleologies and assumptions. Bordering is, in this view, a practical activity, enacted by ordinary people as well as (nation) states, to make sense of and ‘do work’ in the world (Cooper, Perkins 2011: 57).
- Other researchers define bordering both as practices for the constituting, sustaining and modifying of borders and the enacting of border functions itself (Parker, Adler-Nissen 2012).

Even when dealing with the same entity, researchers – in the words of Wittgenstein (1958) – ‘see different aspects’ as the investigation of *state borders* illustrates. Two prominent but hardly related research strands exist:

- A particular prominent strand of Border Studies deals with migration issues and focuses on migration control with the purpose to substantiate political concerns about border-related practices criticized as unfair. In this view, borders are everywhere, where migrants are controlled (Balibar 2004) and state borders appear as closed and disrupting connections.
- On the other hand, scholars involved in regional planning research pursuing the purpose to improve understanding of ongoing processes of cross-border cooperation emphasize

the bridging function of state borders (van Houtum, Eker 2015). In this view, borders appear as permeable or open, as a resource for establishing connections and a site for encounters.

The meanwhile ten years old verdict still holds true that ‘meaning of what constitutes a border for one is not always compatible for another, with the disciplinary semantics and terminologies remaining a significant barrier to a full fusion of ideas’ (Newman 2006: 144). Against this background, the minimal common understanding appears that borders mean different things to different persons (Bauder 2017). Consequently, leading border researchers conclude that a general theory of border is not attainable (Paasi 2011): ‘Creating a single theory is not possible, nor is it necessary’ (Newman 2006: 156).

However, progress in scientific knowledge production rests on the formulation and testing of theories (Popper, Kuhn, Glaser/Strauss). In politically contested areas, research has to prove ‘social robustness’, a feature that depends on the formulation of a theoretically consistent concept (Nowotny et al. 2003). Acknowledging that a general border theory is yet not attainable should not lead to the conclusion to relinquish from theory formation. Rather, research interests and subject should be re-formulated in a way that makes the formulation of theoretical presuppositions at less general level attainable.

For the purpose of this paper, the examination will focus exclusively on *state border* as reference subject and apply the conceptual lens of *the institutional facts theory* (Searle) in combination with a *functional analysis approach* (Merton). In a second step, the concept of *arrangement* (Schatzki) will be introduced in order to assess the potential for further analysis.

2. State Border as institution performing functions

A general theory of borders seems to be unattainable for the moment. One probable way to bring more consistent theorizing back into Border Studies is the focusing on a particular manifestation of borders with a clear conceptual approach. I will focus on State Border and with an application of the institutional facts theory in combination with functional analysis. Thus, I take ‘state border’ and its institutional Status-Functions as subject of analysis.

The term ‘institution’ contains different colloquial meanings.¹ For the social sciences context, the economist Douglass C. North proposed as definition:

‘Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)’ (North 1991, p. 97).

North argued that institutions ‘have been devised by human beings throughout history to create order and reduce uncertainty’. While North emphasizes the constraining nature of institutions,

¹ The word ‘institution’ is a polysemic term applied with different meanings. According to the Pocket Oxford Dictionary (2000) the term institution refers to (1) organization or society founded for a particular purpose; (2) established law, practice, or customs; (3) *colloq.* (of a person etc.) familiar object; (4) instituting or being instituted.

the social philosopher John Searle conceived institutions as (mentally inscribed) rules that not only constrain but also enable space for action. Searle defined an *institution* as

‘any collectively accepted system of rules (procedures, practices) that enable us to create institutional facts’ (Searle 2005, 21f).

Searle explicitly counted also state borders as institutional facts but did not devote special attention to this manifestation. Although the distinction between ‘institution’ and ‘institutional facts’ is not clearly elaborated, the case of money illustrate the implications of the concept ‘institutional fact’:

‘There is nothing in the piece of paper as such that makes it valuable as money, nothing in the piece of metal as such that makes it a valuable coin... Money has value, to put it very crudely, because human beings think it has value. And the form of which that assignment of money value takes is that humans assign a certain status on the piece of paper or the coin, and with that that status, a function that can only be performed in virtue of the collective acceptance of that status. I call these “Status Function”. They are the glue that holds human society together. ... Status Functions include money, property, government, and marriage, and also universities, lawyers, doctors, summer vacations, and cocktail parties’ (Searle 2013, p. 34).

Searle argues that institutional facts are parts of a reality that exists only by human agreement, recognition, or acceptance. The reality of institutional facts distinguishes the human species from any other species. In continuation of the speech-act theory (Austin), Searle argues that institutional facts are created and maintained by linguistic presentation with the same underlying logical structure: ‘They all have the same form as Declarations’ (Searle 2013, p. 35). The source of Declaration, - e.g. the institution – can be rather diffuse (or informal, to use North’s term) or clearly identifiable (like a Federal National Bank in the case of money).

Searle defined, as already mentioned above, an *institution* as ‘any collectively accepted system of rules (procedures, practices) that enable us to create institutional facts’ (Searle 2005, 21f). These rules typically have the form of *X counts as Y in context C*, where an object, person or state of affairs ‘X’ (e.g. paper) is assigned a special status, the Y status (e.g. money), such that the new status enables the person or object to perform functions that it could not perform solely in virtue of its physical structure (e.g. purchase and sell) (Searle 2005, 21f).

Searle argues that the effect of creating Status Functions is to create powers. Powers are increased in virtue of having money, political structures, or given property.

‘These powers are a very peculiar set of powers, marked by such words as “rights”, “duties”, “obligations”, “requirements”, “authorizations”, “permissions”. And just to have general label, I call of these “deontic powers”.’ (Searle 2013, p. 32).

As a characteristic feature, deontic powers

‘involve getting people to do things without using force. (...) So if I make a promise to you, then you do indeed have a deontic power over me, because I have created a binding reason on myself for doing what I promised to do’ (Searle 2010).

The effective operation of institutional facts requires as preconditions the collective acceptance of those participating in the institution and their cooperation in transactions taking place within the institutional frame (Searle 2010).

Being interested to decipher the non-coercive nature of the social ontology of the world, Searle avoids tackling the issue of coercion, force and violence. He does not ask how deontic powers and material power relate. However, Searle's paradigmatic case 'money' reminds that stabilizing the deontic powers of institutional facts requires a material infrastructure that anticipate or respond to non-acceptance and non-cooperation. In order to continue functioning as money, the 'piece of paper' developed to a high-tech banknote consisting of a complex combination of special technical features confirming the legitimate Status-Function as money. In addition, a screening technology is applied that proofs these features in transactions. And finally, the act of counterfeiting is outlawed and reinforced with severe coercive sanctions.

Searle argues that institutional facts perform a Status Assigning Function. However, as the master example introduced by Searle illustrates, money accomplish more functions than only to serve as a mean of payment. It also serves the function to store accumulated wealth for the future, to be spend for charitable purposes, to be invested as capital or dissipated in luxury. Most institutional facts can serve more than one function. The possible multiplicity of functions makes the empirical analysis of institutionalized Status-Functions more complex. Being interested to analyse the working of deontic powers as constitutive component of the social ontology of the world, Searle neglects what can be called the Politics of Status-Function Declaration.

For an analysis of the Politics of Status-Function Declarations, Robert K. Merton (1968: 106) provided an analytic tool with the classic – and today completely unfashionable – functional analysis. Merton defines

functions as 'those observed consequences which make for the adaptation or adjustment of a given system' and *dysfunctions* as 'those objective consequences which lessens the adaptation or adjustment of a system'.

Merton argues that an item – in Searle's terminology an institution - 'may have both functional and dysfunctional consequences'. An item can have more than one functions – and a certain function can be performed by more than one item.

He also proposed to categorize functions with reference to the grade of the consciousness of purpose: *Manifest functions* – as intended and recognized by participants in a systems - and *latent functions* – which are neither intended nor recognized (Merton 1968: 106). In addition, as third possibility not mentioned by Merton, hidden functions should be added as those observable consequences that are intended but should not be recognized as intended by other participants in the systems.

With Merton it becomes clear that Searle deals with the exploration how a special kind of linguistic utterance, e.g. declarations, latently function as creator of the social world. While Searle is interested to learn more about the ontological preconditions and processual logics of declarations and deontic powers, Merton is interested to learn more about the intended and unintended consequences of human activities.

3. Analysis of State Borders' institutionalized Status-Functions

In Border Studies, state borders are frequently termed institution, although in an unspecific manner without a clear conceptualization.² A notable exception provide Cooper and Perkins (2012) who explicitly aim to develop - in orientation to John Searle – an institutional understanding of borders. They analyse 'bordering' as a process of sorting people and things through the imposition of a status-function. However, beyond the sorting functions exposed by Cooper and Perkins, state borders perform more functions – and I argue that the consideration of the aggregated multiplicity of state border functions and its relationships will deepen the understanding of a state border, how it occur, operate and change. In the remainder of this chapter, I will elaborate on the functions of state borders.

(1) *Demarcating authority function*: With Searle, I conceive institutional facts as effect of a *Status Function Declaration*. In the case of state borders, declarations can be identified as a series of joint declarations of states codified in international law documents. Based on the proclaimed and collectively accepted principle of reciprocal sovereignty, the institutional fact 'state border' with the assigned Status-Function 'to demarcate the spatial limits of legitimate exercise of state authority' (Müller 2013) is constituted. The first and prior function of state borders is the institutionalization of the principle of non-interference of one state in the affairs of another state. State borders have its source in and exists due to the cooperation of states participating in the institution state border. In this regard, state borders are overlapping concerns and 'bordering is not an action, but an *interaction*' (Parker, Adler-Nissen 2012, p. 790).

(2) *Constituting territorial authority*: The reciprocal acceptance of a self-limitation of legitimate exercise of authority transform the space within state borders into a territory where state agencies can exert authority without interference from outside (Ruggie 1993). As the history of the early modern borders in Europe indicate (Di Fiore 2016), this function does not necessarily require to conceive a state border as a sharp line of spatial demarcation. Once established as institutional fact through reciprocal acceptance and cooperation, territorial authorities obtained the authorization to unilaterally assign Status-Function to its border. The variety of material endowment of state border installations illustrates the case: some territorial powers erect walls or fences while others signpost their state borders merely with a signpost.

(3) *Structuration of border crossings*: For diplomatic, commercial, social or practical reasons, governments have to admit at least some border crossings. Thus, borders do serve as a membrane, although with a high variability in the porosity. The 'structuration of border crossings' is an essential function of borders (Eigmüller 2016: 60). The structuration is based on the declaration of a certain territorial status (of being *foreign* or *alien*) assigned to entities – persons and goods - crossing the state border or being present in the territory. The *territorial status* renders "rights", "duties", "obligations", "requirements", "authorizations", "permissions" to the assigned. It implies for example that particular goods are subject to customs duties, or that persons are unauthorized to cross the state border, not permitted to take up income-generating employment, or have the duty to register with police. The particular shape and content of the territorial status is principally subject to territorial state authorities' discretion, although not as an

² For example Eigmüller (2016: 67) or Popescu (2012: 24f),

isolated act: ‘state bordering practices are to a long degree performed in interaction with other types of non-state actors, processes and organisations’ (Ruggie 1993, p. 776).

(4) *Virtual assigning of territorial status*: Once declared, territorial status operates as a virtual classification (Douglas, Bowker/Star) assigning territorial status to all entities. The territorial status counts *independently from practical operations* of approval or disapproval. For example, visa-free entrance regulations may authorize entry and stay of foreign persons as tourists with the specification that they refrain from income-generating activities. In case a foreign tourist takes up an income generating activity, he or she count in the virtual framework of state border classification not as tourist but as irregular migrant, even though the territorial status is not detected.

(5) *Policing of territorial status*: In Searle’s view, institutional facts are effective without threat or use of coercive means – they exercise ‘deontic power’. However, the non-coercive force of deontic powers is limited. The preconditions of collective recognition and of cooperation are not always given. Not all addressed recognize the institutionally declared rules or procedures. Smuggling contraband or irregular migration indicate that some persons definitely addressed do not accept and do not cooperate in the institutional frame they find themselves placed without choice. The effectiveness of institutional facts requires some *enforcement mechanisms* (North 1991). Since institutions as such cannot act, special *institutional apparatuses* enacted by *appointed agents* – human beings or technological actants - exercise the tasks to claim and enforce compliance, in particular by screening cross-border movement, controlling and investigating suspicious cases.

The function to police border-crossing entities – persons or goods – in order to clarify the consistency of virtual and actual territorial status is usually assigned to state border apparatuses. These apparatuses feature a broad degree of variations in time and space.

- a) With regard to the policed *entity*: for example, during most of the 19th century until 1905, the British authorities controlled only the entrance of goods but not of persons (Reinecke 2009).
- b) With regard to the policing *apparatus*: The control function may be distributed among specialised organisations, like border-guard, customs, police or even private organisations.
- c) With regard to the *policing intensity*: At some borders, all crossing persons are required to pass checkpoints, while at other borders controls are completely abolished and entities can cross a state border freely.
- d) With regard to the *site* of policing: The policing of territorial status can be performed at special state border checkpoints, but also in other sites in the interior or outside the territory.
- e) *Cooperation* in policing: Controls can be an activity jointly performed by border apparatuses of involved states on a bi- or multilateral basis, or completely one-sided and without cooperation, like the controls at the Berlin Wall until 1989.

(6) *Imposing consequences*: Finally, the policing of territorial status lead to the implementation of consequences. In case of approved consistency of declared and asserted features, the territorial

status is approved and the unit can pass or legitimately remain in the territory. In case of inconsistency, the consequence is the removal from territory or denial of entrance with the immediate rejection, or arresting and further legal investigations. Again, the competences of the involved state border agencies vary with regard to the authorization to stop, to search, to confiscate goods or to reject and to arrest persons.

(7) *Performing latent border functions*: In addition to the manifest functions discussed so far, state borders exert also latent and hidden functions. With regard to latent functions, an important aspect is the symbolical function of serving as reference and confirmor of a collective identity. ‘The “fact” the border helps produce is shared understandings of the identities of particulars, both internal *and* external to the particular self’ (Parker, Adler-Nissen 2012, p. 778). As the numerous multi-ethnic and multi-lingual states indicate, national identity does not depend exclusively on ethnic or cultural similarity but can also root in the believe in a common history (Anderson, Weber). State borders perform also an epistemological function by producing particular conditions for understanding ‘reality’. The state border ‘slices the world up into different pieces of reality that we cannot know equally well’ (Parker, Adler-Nissen 2012, p. 778) and thus serve as a horizon for assigning relevance to particular issues and events. State borders

‘help provide *conditions for decisions* as to what is of value. (...) These decisional frameworks underpin indicators of benefit of dysfunctions agreed upon for the inside. They define parameters for actions in relation to others, both inside and outside. Finally, borders and boundaries clarify who may participate in any decisions made in the name of the collective whole. In short: boundaries are a precondition for decision and action at the level of the constituted whole – especially where decision-making is undertaken in a ‘constitutionalised manner, such as in a constitutional democracy’ (Parker, Adler-Nissen 2012, p. 779).

Consequently, it is expected that those within state borders possess as insiders greater knowledge that ‘reduces uncertainties regarding our common knowledge on the inside’ (Parker, Adler-Nissen 2012, p. 778). The epistemological horizon constituted by a state border is shaped by the particular historical and situational context: As a rule, citizens of ‘great’ states show – on average – less interest in the issues and events taking place in an adjacent smaller country than vice versa. However, once a topical interest has developed on a more organised base, the chance increases that issues or events related to this interest and identified as being relevant may catch attention also when it takes place beyond the state border.

(8) *Performing hidden functions*: State borders receive some attention by critical border studies as instruments applied by rich and powerful elites for oppression, maintaining of global injustice, global apartheid and the protection of unjust privileges (Bauder 2017). Although it is appealing to assume ‘hidden agendas’ behind policies, the approval of imputations is difficult and the simple inference from a consequence to the alleged purpose impossible.

Discussion of implications

As institution, a state borders assembles a set of Status-Functions which are combined and enacted with broad variety. One important implication is the observation that a state border

cannot be holistically characterized as open, closed or permeable. State borders are rather open, closed or permeable with regard to a particular function. Consequently, a state border may be characterized as open with regard to some function, closed with regard to others, and permeable with regard to still others.

The operation of a function involves the engagement and interaction of institutions, people and things. As Searle has argued, institutions depend on collective acceptance and cooperation.

In the next chapter, the concept of arrangement is introduced as a possible theoretical frame for an exploration how acceptance and cooperation do or do not occur.

4. State border as institutionalized arrangement

So far, a state border is conceptualised as an institutional fact with Status-Functions. In order to learn more about the operation of state border functions, this chapter elaborates the idea of arrangement as a conceptual tool.

According to lexical explication the word ‘arrangement’ implies the two aspects of *ordering* and of *agreement*.³ Introducing the concept of arrangement in Border Studies thus aims to sensitize that social order – although inevitably an effect of border demarcation processes⁴ – cannot be reduced to be the effect of uni-directional top-down imposition (conceived as a static arrangement). In fact, it always involves some degree of acceptance – and social *orders* are conceived as arrangements resulting from power struggles between actors who are guided by their respective ‘interests’. Stability or fragility of an order rests on the degree at which the relevant actors *come to terms with*, in other words: arrange with an order, at least in form of a latent acceptance and minimum cooperation.

The word *arrangement* is frequently used in social sciences in a colloquial meaning as either ‘ordering of elements’ or ‘agreeing’, usually without adopting the status of a constitutive theoretical building block. More conceptual relevance received the term arrangement in the ancient Rhetoric (Aristoteles) (in the sense of ordering), in the Sociology of Critique (in the sense of agreement) and in a strand of Practice Theory (in a sense combining ordering and agreement).

For the purpose of this paper, I relate to a concept of arrangement developed by the Practice Theorist Theodore R. Schatzki. He defined an *arrangement* as ‘a layout of entities in which they relate and take up places with respect to one another’ (Schatzki 2001, p. 51).

According to Schatzki, arrangements are constitutive elements of *social order*. He defines social order ‘as arrangements of people and the organisms, artifacts, and things through which they coexist’ (ibid.). Schatzki illustrates the idea with a case:

³ See <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/arrangement>, or <http://wortschatz.uni-leipzig.de/abfrage/>

⁴ ‘Boundaries (and *a fortiori* borders) reduce the points with the environment, thus following the internal conditioning of various relations with the environment. Only where borders do exist, relations between system and environment can increase their complexity, their differentiation, and their controlled mutability’ (Luhmann 1982: 236).

‘An example is an arrangement of teacher, students, desks, chalkboard, plants, and seeing eye dog in a classroom. In this arrangement, the cited entities relate spatially, causally, intentionally (via mental states), and prefigurationally (roughly, by enabling and constraining one another’s activities). They thereby take up positions with regard to one another that combine aspects of these four dimensions. As elements of the arrangement, these entities also possess identities (who someone is) or meanings (what something is). For something’s meaning/identity is a function of its relations, just as conversely its relations are a function of its meaning/identity. Teachers, for example, face and lecture to students because of who they all are, just as who they are depends on this orientation and activity’ (Schatzki 2001, p. 51).

In his ‘conception of social order as arrangement’, meanings and identities are tied to social order:

‘To proclaim the interrelated meanings and identities of arranged items a key component of social order is to declare being central to order. It is to acknowledge, first, that there are no arrangements that are not arrangements of somethings and, second, that social somethings, perhaps somethings in general, *are* somethings as parts of arrangements. This latter thesis does not allege that being derives solely from positionality in arrangements. As will be discussed, being also springs from contexts in which arrangements exist’ (Schatzki 2001, p. 51).

Schatzki argues that people (and some organisms) possess identities and that artifacts, things, organisms and people bear meanings not as such, but ‘as elements of arrangements’ (Schatzki 2001, p. 51).

Schatzki continues that social order is instituted within *practices* (53), defined as ‘organized nexuses of activity’ (56) like cooking practices, rearing practices or farming practices. Practices constitute an ‘organized web of activity’ that exhibits two overall dimensions: activity and organization. ‘A practice is a set of doings and sayings that is organized by a pool of understandings, a set of rules, and something I call “teleoaffective structure”’ (Schatzki 2001, p. 58).

(1) *Set of actions*: Schatzki conceptualises a practice first as ‘a set of actions’. The actions that compose a practice are either bodily doings and sayings or actions that these doings or sayings constitute. ‘Bodily doings and sayings’ are actions that people directly perform bodily. One of the examples is ‘handing over money’ (56).

Schatzki argues that arrangements – their relations, identities and meanings – are determined within social practices. One crucial aspect of this determination is the bringing about of arrangements through human activity. Another is the institution of the meanings and identities that humans and nonhumans possess as components of arrangements. Both ‘processes’ – the human action and the possession of identities and meanings - depend on the organization of practices (61).

According to Schatzki, practices are organized by mind and the organizing phenomena resolve into mental conditions (61). For Schatzki, ‘mental states, instead of being objects or processes, are *states of affairs* that obtain with respect to a person: that such and such is annoying, the case,

or something to possess or realize' (57). Mental states are expressed in behaviour (like praying) and inform activity by determining what makes sense to people to do (57). With regard to understanding, the first organizing phenomenon that link the actions composing a practice, Schatzki argues that it is better construed as abilities that pertain to those actions. One such ability is knowing how to perform a particular action that is one of the practice's constituent action (59). Two other important abilities in this context are knowing how to identify appropriate actions and knowing how to prompt as well as to respond to such actions: 'The actions that compose a given practice, consequently, are linked by cross-referencing and interdependent know-hows that they express concerning their performance, identification, instigation, and response' (59). Understanding sometimes helps determine what specifically makes sense to people to do. Knowing, for instance, what another person is doing helps determine how to respond to her. However, an actors' behaviour is primarily determined not by understanding, but by rules, teleology, and affectivity.

(2) *Rules*: Rules, the second organizing phenomena, are 'explicit formulations that enjoin or school in particular actions' (59). Statute law, 'rules of thumb', and explicit normative enjoinings exemplify Schatzki's understanding of 'rule'.

'What people do often reflects formulations of which they are aware. For what makes sense to them to do often reflects their understanding of (or desire to circumvent etc.) specific rules. Indeed, practices harbor collections of rules that practitioners (or subsets thereof) are supposed to observe. Farming practices, for instance, embrace different though overlapping sets of directives and instructions for farmers, hired help, and children. So the actions composing a practice are linked, second, through the collection of rules that they observe; more precisely, through understandings of these rules that they express' (Schatzki 2001, p. 60).

However, rules never simpliciter determine what people specifically do. As a third factor, a mix of teleology and affectivity comes in. 'Teleology is the orientation towards an end, while affectivity is how things matter' (Schatzki 2001, p. 60). What makes sense to a person to do largely depends on the matters for the sake of which she is prepared to act, on how she will proceed for the sake of achieving or possessing those matters, and on how things matter to her; thus on her ends, the projects and tasks she will carry out for the sake of those ends given her beliefs, hopes, and expectations, and her emotions and moods (Schatzki 2001, p. 60).

(3) *Teleoaffective Structure*: Schatzki takes teleology and affectivity as a clue, the third dimension of the organization of a practice. He specifies teleology and affectivity – from the point of an actor - as a normative 'teleoaffective structure,' a range of acceptable or correct ends, acceptable or correct tasks to carry out for these ends, acceptable or correct beliefs (etc.) given which specific tasks are carried out for the sake of these ends, and even acceptable or correct emotions out of which to do so (Schatzki 2001, 60f).

Schatzki concedes that practices reveal further "structural" features, for instance, regularities in and causal connections between their constituent actions, as well as layouts and linkages between the material settings in which they transpire. 'But it is by virtue of expressing certain

understandings, rules, ends, projects, beliefs, and emotions (etc.) that behaviors form an organized manifold' (Schatzki 2001, p. 61).

Schatzki emphasizes the changeability of arrangements: In response to contingent events, the incidentally involved doings and sayings and the understandings, rules, and teleoaffectivities that organize them, can change over time (61).

Schatzki continues to argue that arrangements are established, not just within individual practices, but also across them: 'Whereas arrangements within practices rest on the actions and organizations of individual practices, arrangements across them rest on the actions and organizations of different practices' (Schatzki 2001, p. 61). Thus, social order is conceived as arrangements of arrangements.

Discussion

The conceptualisation of 'social order as arrangement of people and the organisms, artifacts, and things through which they coexist' (Schatzki 2001, p. 51) offers a conceptual lens for an investigation of the formation, operation and changing of state borders. Border related activities are constituted by the practice of bordering as component of an 'organized web of activity'.

In this view, each Status Function assigned to a state border constitutes an arrangement, 'a layout of entities in which they relate and take up places with respect to one another' (Schatzki 2001, p. 51). A state border can be conceptualized as an arrangement of arrangements.

The practice theoretical concept of arrangement adds to the 'institutional facts theory' by emphasizing as factors shaping actions the bodily performance and mental ability of involved actors. The introduction of understandings, rules and teleoaffective structures as organising elements of activities provide a

However, like Searle, Schatzki deals rather with nonviolent human coexistence and neglects the aspect of coercion latently inscribed in state border arrangements as infrastructural power (Mann 1984).

7. Final Remarks

This paper presented work in progress aiming to contribute to the theoretical debates in border studies. The paper introduced conceptual ideas from social philosophy and social sciences and tentatively outlined implications for a theoretically guided conceptualisation of state borders.

The introduction and application of John Searle's Theory of Institutional Facts and Robert K. Merton's Functional Analysis yields an awareness that institution and function has to be clearly distinguished.

The subsequent identification and description of state border functions is a first and tentative outline that will be subject to further amendments.

The introduction of Theodore Schatzki's conceptualisation of arrangement serves the purpose to consider the explanatory potential of this concept. The application for the conceptualisation of state border is a task still ahead.

Feed-back is highly appreciated.

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